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A model is developed which allows us to examine the welfare effects of alternative 
methods of financing access to higher education. Under an extreme specification of 
the social welfare function, it is shown that it does not matter whether higher 
education is financed privately or through the exchequer. Under a more general 
specification of the social welfare function, conditions may be derived under which 
(a) private finance is more welfare enhancing than public finance and (b) public 
finance is more welfare enhancing than private finance. Empirical estimates of the 
social welfare function are used to draw policy conclusions. 
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There has been a considerable recent literature on the appropriate means for funding 
higher education. Recent examples include the Greenaway and Haynes (2000) report, 
Chapman (1997) and Barr and Crawford (1998). These have generally been 
supportive of reforms that shift the burden of paying for higher education away from 
the general taxpayer and toward students. The argument is, essentially, that the main 
beneficiary should bear the main burden of the cost of tuition. This follows from the 
user pays principle, and - to mainstream economists, at least - has not been regarded 
as particularly contentious. This is so much so, that economists have not hitherto 
challenged themselves with the question of how to come up with estimates of the 
benefits of the user pays principle in this context.  
 
This paper represents a first attempt to tackle this question. In order to do so, I shall 
develop a model which is quite general, and which is capable of accommodating 
conditions under which private funding of higher education is more efficient, equally 
efficient, or less efficient than the publicly funded alternative. The model will allow 
us to appreciate why the funding of higher education has become a politically 
contentious issue in many countries, in spite of the near consensus amongst 
economists in favour of the user pays principle.  Finally, the model allows back-of-
the-envelope calculations to be made concerning the welfare effects of various 
funding mechanisms. 
  
The paper proceeds as follows. The theoretical framework is set out in the next 
section. This is followed by an empirical section which presents the back-of-the-
envelope calculations. The paper ends with a conclusion that sets out a number of 




Consider the following, extremely simple, model of education finance. Individual i 
receives disposable income of Yi where 
 
Yi = (Y0 + siθi)(1-τ) 
 
where Y0 is a constant, si is a binary variable that indicates whether or not i has 
attended tertiary schooling, θi is a stochastic variable which is assumed to follow a 
uniform distribution and which varies between some strictly negative number and 
some strictly positive number, and τ is the (proportional) rate of income tax. Tax in 
this model is paid solely for the purposes of financing education. It would be possible 
for the tax rate to equal zero if all education were paid for privately. Alternatively, if 
the tax rate exceeds zero there is some element of subsidy for education. We shall 
suppose that there is a single period, and that incomes and expenditures are incurred 
at the end of this period. 
 
Education is assumed to take place instantaneously. This means that educated and 
uneducated individuals alike have the opportunity to earn an income. Direct costs of education are covered by the cost term, c0. This cost may be paid entirely by 
individuals, for example by securing a loan - in which case the tax rate is zero and the 
loan must be repaid at the end of the period. Or the cost may be borne entirely through 
the tax system. In this case the government pays for each educated worker's 
education, and the rate of proportional tax is set so as to offset this cost exactly.  
 
For each worker, i, net income is defined as Yi - ci where ci is the private cost of 
education to i in the tth period. Where education is paid for privately, this will either 
be c0, if the individual is educated, or zero if she is not. In this case τ=0. Where 
education is paid for entirely through the tax system, however, ci will equal zero for 
all individuals - but in this case τ>0.  
 
Suppose individual i undertakes schooling iff 
 
(Y0 + siθi)(1-τ) - ci  ≥ Y0(1-τ) 
 
that is, iff the discounted value of post-schooling income (net of costs) is at least as 
great as the discounted value of income if no schooling is undertaken. 
 
In solving the central problem of this paper, it will be necessary to work from a 
definition of social welfare. To provide a general definition, let social welfare, W, be 
defined as a weighted sum of the net incomes of all workers. Unit weight is attached 
to the incomes of uneducated workers, while a weight of σ is attached to the incomes 
of educated workers. This specification of the welfare function is quite general: setting σ=1 implies a utilitarian welfare function, while setting lower values of σ 
implies the attachment of a higher weight to the net income of the less well educated 
workers. As we shall see later, the most interesting values of σ lie in the range 0<σ<1. 
 
Assume that the government chooses τ to maximise W. The distribution of θ has 
supports θmin and θmax. Denote by n the population size. 
 
Consider first the case where all education is privately financed, so that τ=0. Those 
individuals who can augment their income by more than c0 by undertaking education, 
and paying for it, will choose to do so. The proportion of the population that does not 
undertake education is (c0-θmin)/(θmax - θmin), and each of these individuals 
receives an income of Y0. The remainder of the population receives an income which 
is distributed between Y0+c0 and Y0+θmax. Hence total social welfare is given by 
 
W = n{Y0 (c0-θmin) + σ[Y0+(θmax+c0)/2 -c0](θmax-c0)}/(θmax-θmin) 
 
Turn now to consider the case in which all education is funded through the tax 
system. This is a little more complicated, because it entails solving the model for the 
optimal rate of taxation. Suppose, as before, that those undertaking education are 
those at the top end of the θ distribution, and suppose also that the proportion who 
undertake education is given by λ.  
 
Total tax revenue is given by 
 τn{Y0 + λ[θmax - λ(θmax-θmin)/2]} 
since the term in curly brackets is the pre-tax income of the typical individual. The 
total cost of education is c0λn. Setting tax revenue equal to government expenditure 
allows us to solve for λ, which must of course lie within the unit interval. Hence 
 
λ = {τθmax-c0 ± √[(τθmax-c0)2 + 2τ2Y0(θmax-θmin]}/τ(θmax-θmin) 
 
Social welfare is given by the weighted sum of all disposable incomes, and hence 
 
W =  n(1-τ){ (1-λ)Y0 + σλ Y0 + σλ[θmax-λ(θmax-θmin)/2]}  
 
Substituting λ out of this expression, we can investigate the effect that varying τ 
would have on welfare. Substituting the welfare maximising value of τ back into the 
social welfare function then allows the calculation of social welfare.  
 
Some interesting observations are worth making at this stage. First, under a utilitarian 
regime (where σ=1), the choice of funding system has no impact on welfare. Since 
social welfare is an unweighted sum of net incomes, it does not matter who pays for 
the education - so long as the socially optimal number of workers get educated (and 
here that is assured by choice of the tax rate), the level of economic welfare will be 
the same regardless of funding mechanism. Who pays differs according to regime, but 
who pays is not interesting given the nature of the social welfare function. This means 
that, if we adopt a utilitarian social welfare function, the question of whether 
education is paid for through the tax system or privately is a red herring.   
Interestingly, a Rawlsian social welfare function also has the property that it does not 
matter whether education is publicly or privately financed. If it is privately financed, 
those who can benefit from it will invest in it, leaving the net income of the remainder 
unaffected. Meanwhile, if it were publicly financed, those who do not undertake 
education would be made worse off by tax payments; so in the Rawlsian model with 
public finance, nobody would receive education, and the utility of the poorest member 
of society would be the same as would be the case under private funding of education. 
 
The same is not true, however, for more general cases in which σ is less than one. 
This is most easily appreciated by consideration of some empirical examples, and 






Consider the following values for the key parameters of the model. Let 
θmax=200000, θmin=-700000, Y0=300000, c0=25000 and n=30 million. The value 
of Y0 may be interpreted as the discounted value of lifetime earnings for the group of 
uneducated workers. If money values are measured in pounds, then the figures we 
have here may be thought of as a rough approximation to the United Kingdom 
context. Other assumed values of these parameters could clearly be used in order to 
reflect the position in other countries. 
 If σ=1 (the utilitarian case), W=9.5104x1012 in both the public finance and private 
finance scenarios. When financed through taxes, the optimal value of τ in this case is 
0.015, yielding λ=0.19.  
 
Consider now some cases in which σ<1. To begin, consider what would happen if 
σ=0.975. Under private finance, W=9.4539x1012, while under public finance, 
W=9.4518x1012 with τ=0.014 and λ=0.1800. Clearly in this case private finance 
offers a higher level of welfare than does public finance. Notice that, under public 
finance, the level of education has fallen below the level that obtains under private 
finance.  
 
Now consider the case where σ=0.75. This yields a value for W of 8.9453x1012 in the 
private finance scenario, but a value of 9.0571x1012 under public finance. The 
optimal value of τ under public finance is 0.006, giving a value of λ of 0.0750. The 
level of education under public finance has fallen further. So while public finance 
offers greater welfare in this example than does private finance, it also provides a 
solution that yields a lower average level of education in the workforce and lower 
average earnings. 
 
Why does this reversal take place from a situation where private finance is best for 
welfare to one in which public finance is better? Under private finance, those who can 
benefit from education do so. Under public finance, education is offered only to the 
extent that it raises social welfare. If the weight attached by society to the welfare of 
the richer (more highly educated) group is sufficiently low, then so will be society's investment in education. More people will then belong to the less highly educated 
group, and the greater weight that these extra people have in the social welfare 
function more than offsets the loss of income to the highly educated group. 
 
To clarify further, consider the impact on social welfare of public and private finance 
respectively, where education levels are kept constant across the two funding regimes. 
This means that λ is constrained to be 0.19 and τ is constrained to be 0.015 under 
public finance. In this case, with σ=0.975, welfare under public finance is 
9.4515x1012. This compares with the 9.4539x1012 reported earlier for the private 
finance case. Likewise, where σ=0.75, welfare under public finance is now 
8.9211x1012, compared with 8.9453x1012 under private finance. These figures make 
clear that, given society's investment in education, private finance is more efficient 
than public finance. Public finance becomes more efficient at lower levels of σ only 
because it allows a welfare enhancing (albeit not libertarian) cap to be put on the 
extent of educational investment. Where prospective students are able to migrate to 
buy education privately in other countries, the imposition of such a cap may not in 
any event be feasible. 
 
Using the figures provided for the example above, and once more allowing tax to 
settle to its welfare maximising level, it is possible to establish the critical value of σ 
at which welfare is the same under both public and private finance. This value is 0.94.  
 
From the above discussion, it is clearly important to have some idea of the true value 
of σ. Fortunately, we have recently been given a clue. Recent work by Alesina et al. 
(2001) involves the contruction of an empirical happiness function in which macroeconomic variables play a part. In particular, these authors study the impact of 
the mean income level and the distribution of income upon happiness. Using their 
results as a guide,
1 we shall assume in the sequel a value of σ=0.3114. It is worth 
noting in passing that this low value is in accord with other work conducted using 
happiness measures by Easterlin (1995). The evidence provided by numerous studies 
is that the time trend of happiness has not mirrored the upward trend in incomes. This 
is not to say that income does not matter - at any one point in time, higher income 
individuals tend to be happier than lower income individuals. But in the aggregate, the 
level of income does not seem to be a particularly strong determinant of happiness, 
though the distribution of income is. 
 
Since 0.3114 is below the critical value (of σ=0.94), the above results an be 
interpreted as a case (in welfare terms, not in terms of income maximisation) for 
public funding of higher education in the United Kingdom. If, however, λ and τ are 
chosen by government to replicate the free market levels of education, rather than to 
maximise social welfare, public finance entails a welfare loss. With σ=0.3114, 
welfare would then be 7.9538x1012 under private finance and 7.8872x1012 under 





Numerous caveats ought to be attached to the above analysis. First, θ may more 
realistically have a non-uniform distribution. Secondly, the model as it stands 
                                                 
1 See appendix. comprises a single period; a multiperiod model in which education takes time and 
where loans are repaid with interest would clearly match more closely what we 
observe in the world. It would allow foregone earnings to be included in the model. It 
would also allow consideration of situations in which λ is not stable over time. 
Thirdly, the estimate of σ given above is likely to be imprecise; it is obtained from the 
results of Alesina et al. (2001) for the United States which themselves are not 
estimated with precision. Further work should be aimed at providing better estimates 
of the empirical social welfare function, and in particular on the role played by the 
level and distribution of income. Fourthly, the model as it stands does not allow for 
externalities due to education. Fifthly, the model as it stands does not accommodate 
the incentive effects of taxation, and in particular does not allow taxation to influence 
work effort. Finally, the types of funding mechanisms considered here are extremes - 
full private finance and full public finance only.  
 
The figures reported above must therefore be treated with some considerable caution. 
All of these caveats could be removed by further development of the model, and this 
in itself sets an agenda for further research. In particular, we need to know more 
precisely what the determinants of social welfare are - and that knowledge needs to 
inform economic policy, not only in the sphere of educational finance, but widely. 
 
The central aim of this paper has been modest - to establish whether or not it is worth 
having an argument about how higher education is financed. The conclusion that we 




Suppose that the income distribution may be characterised, extremely simply, by a 
group of educated workers who earn on average Y1, and a group of uneducated 
workers who earn Y2. The former group comprise ξ of the whole. Note that, in a 
model of this type, the Gini coefficient is given by 
 
½ - [ξ2Y1 + (1+ξ)(1-ξ)Y2] / 2[ξY1+(1-ξ)Y2] 
 
Linearising around ξ=0.1, Y1=25000 and Y2=15000 yields 
 
½ - (0.4951 - 0.2324ξ - 2.637x10-6Y1 + 4.395x10-6Y2) 
 
Alesina et al. (2001, Table 3.4 column 1)
2 show that, on average, the marginal effect 
on happiness (H) of a one standard deviation change in mean income is 0.003, while 
the corresponding figure for a change in the Gini coefficient is -0.001. These figures 
imply that the marginal effect of a unit change in mean income is 1.446 x 10-6, while 
that of a unit change in the inequality measure is -0.0357.  
 
Hence the happiness function may be expressed as  
 
H = 1.446x10-6[ξY1 + (1-ξ)Y2] - 0.0357[½ - (0.4951 - 0.2324ξ - 2.637x10-6Y1 + 
4.395x10-6Y2)]+constant 
 
Imposing ξ=0.1, this may be rewritten as: 
 




b1=5.0459x10-7 and b2=1.6203x10-6. This confirms that, in the social welfare 
function, more weight is attached to the income earned by the lower income group 
than to that of the higher income group. Using these values and grossing up, I can 
infer that σ equals b1/b2, that is 0.3114. 
 
It should be noted at this stage that there remains some controversy about whether it is 
legitimate to represent the happiness function as a social welfare function. As Arrow 
(1951) demonstrated, the aggregation of individual preferences into a social welfare 
function may not be possible under reasonable conditions. But if, as here, it is   
supposed that interpersonal comparisons of utility can be made - I am using a cardinal 
measure of happiness - then Arrow's theorem does not hold (Sen, 1970). The 
controversy therefore boils down to the reliability of the happiness data. Much work 
                                                 
2 This is based on a model for the United States. Alesina et al. do not report marginal effects for the 
corresponding model using European data, although much of the work in their paper is based on data 
from the Eurobarometer data set. in psychology (see, for example, Argyle, 1989), and an increasing body of work in 
economics (Oswald, 1997; di Tella et al., 2001) suggests that the data are dependable. 
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